This paper uses variation in traffic safety laws and obesity rates to identify substitution patterns between living and cadaveric kidney donors. Using panel data from 1988-2008, we find that a 1% decrease in the supply of cadaveric donors per 100,000 increases the supply of living donors per 100,000 by .7%. With respect to traffic safety laws, a national adoption of partial helmet laws is estimated to decrease cadaveric donors by 6%, but leads to a 4.2% increase in the number of living donors, or a net effect of 1.8% decrease in the supply of kidney donations. The recent rise in obesity rates is estimated to increase living donor rates by roughly 18%. Lastly, we find evidence that increases in disposable income per capita is associated with an increase in the number of non-biological living donors within a state, but is not found to have an effect on biological donor rates.
Introduction
On April 21 st 2008, there were 101,687 patients awaiting an organ transplant, but only 27,958 transplants were performed in that year. 1 The critical shortage of organs is the result of an artificial price ceiling instituted by the National Organ Transplant Act of 1984, which makes financial compensation for organs unlawful. For this reason, the current supply of organs is generated by cadaveric and altruistic living donors.
The number of living donors has increased dramatically from 1,769 in 1988 to 5,955 in 2008 or an increase of 237% (as seen in Figure 1 ). Over the same period, the ratio of biological donors to living donors has decreased from 93% to 60%. Although the shortage of organs for donation has received considerable attention in both the academic literature and the press, there is still little empirical evidence identifying potential causes for the increase in living donor rates, the trade-offs between living and cadaveric donors, and the change in living donor composition from primarily biological donors to a substantial increase in non-biological donors.
In this paper we consider the effect that motor vehicle safety laws and the growing obesity epidemic has on the supply of living donors. Unlike cadaveric donors where the functional value of the organ to the donor is small, living donors must consider the potential long term healthcare cost associated with donating an organ. These costs include an increase in both mortality and morbidity risk, lost wages generated by time away from work during recovery, and possibly long term poor health. Potential living donors must weigh these costs and benefits conditional on alternative sources of organs (cadaveric organs and other living donors) as well as increases in the demand for organs.
With respect to motor vehicle safety laws, we study how changes in seat belt, helmet, and speed limit laws indirectly affect the number of living donors by shifting the supply of cadaveric organ donations. Previous studies have considered how changes in these safety laws would affect motor vehicle fatalities and cadaveric donations. According to the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN), roughly 16% of cadaveric donations are the result of a motor vehicle accident. Ashenfelter and Greenstone (2002) The use of obesity rates to estimate shifts in the demand for organs is motivated by recent medical research linking obesity and renal disease. 2 The primary risk factor for type II diabetes, a leading cause of renal failure, is obesity. Hsu et. al (2006) finds that obese patients are 6 to 7 times more likely to develop renal failure than individuals of normal weight. In Sweden, Ejerblad et. al (2006) estimates that being overweight at age 20 tripled the odds of chronic kidney failure. These studies highlight the potential link between obesity and the demand for kidney transplants.
We propose using state-year variation in motor safety laws and obesity rates as instruments for the supply of cadaveric organs and the demand for organs in a state, In the following section, we provide a brief overview concerning changes in motor vehicle safety laws in the US. Section 3 describes the data gathered from the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) as well as changes in state demographics used to conduct the analysis. Section 4 presents the empirical model and results. Lastly, Section 5 concludes.
A Brief History of Motor Vehicle Safety Laws

Speed Limits
Prior to 1974, speed limits were determined by states and local governments. 
Data
The 1984 As illustrated in Figure 1 , the number of living donors has increased dramatically over the last twenty years. Perhaps more interestingly, the percent of living donors who are not related to the donee has also increased from roughly 7% in 1988 to 40% in 2008. One reason for this increase is a change in the surgical procedure used to harvest the kidney. Prior to the introduction of laparoscopic surgery, a 4 to 7 inch incision was needed to retrieve the kidney, which would significantly increase the pain and recovery time associated with the procedure.
According to Schweitzer et. al. (2000) , the use of laparoscopic surgery has decreased hospital recovery time from four and a half days to three days and has allowed donors to return to work 27 days faster. Clearly, this medical advancement decreases the non-pecuniary cost of donating an organ for a living donor, but costs are also decreased to the donee. Although NOTA stipulates it is unlawful to provide financial compensation to the donor, the ordinance does allow for payment to cover expenses directly incurred by the organ donor for the purposes of the donation, like travel costs and lost wages. 6 These non-medical cost are not covered by insurance. Instead, these costs are paid out of pocket. By reducing time away from work, compensation associated with lost wages is also decreased. This incentive can potentially establish a link between non-biological donors and disposable income.
Although, OPO's may serve several surrounding states, we follow Dickert-Conlin, Elder, and Moore (2009) According to the CDC:
10 states had a prevalence of obesity less than 10% and no states had prevalence equal to or greater than 15% in 1990. By 1998 no state had a prevalence of obesity less than 10%. In 2007, only one state (Colorado) had a prevalence of obesity less than 20%. Thirty states reported a prevalence equal to or greater than 25% and three states (Alabama, Mississippi and Tennessee) had a prevalence of obesity equal to or greater than 30%.
These increases in obesity rates appear to coincide with increases in the number of living donors and the size of the organ donor waiting list. We find that 81% of the states in our sample report obesity rates between 10%-24%. 
Model and Results
Consider the following conceptual model based on living donors being altruistic. A living donor's utility function takes the form of 1 , , , = max + * * , − + * where H represents the donor's Health level, c is cost to health for donating an organ, p is the probability the organ recipient receives an organ from a cadaveric donor, is the level of altruism the donor has for the organ recipient. According to United Network of Organ Sharing organization, patients receiving a kidney from a living donor (LD) rather than a cadaveric donor (CD) have higher survival rates. For this reason, we assume an organ recipient's utility is higher when receiving an organ from a living donor, U(LD)>U(CD). In relative utility, the potential donor chooses not to donate if > − or the cost of donation is greater than the relative expected benefit of supplying an organ from a living donor. As previously discussed, costs faced by the donor include pain associated with the procedure, lost wages due to time away from work for the procedure, and potentially can include lower lifetime income due to a lower lifetime level of health. As costs tend to decrease, due to advancements in medicine, the supply of living donors should increase, ceteris paribus.
Altruism plays an important role in this model as well. For our purposes, altruism is captured by allowing the donor's utility to be dependent upon the donee's utility. Further, the more familiar a donor is with the done the larger becomes in the donor's utility function.
Altruism allows there to be a positive supply of organs at a price of zero. the supply of living donors. We use an instrumental variables approach to control for the econometric endogeneity problem caused by unobserved altruism.
Our estimation strategy uses organ demand shifters (changes in obesity rates) and supply shifters (seat belt laws, helmet laws, and speed limits) as instruments to identify potential substitution patterns between cadaveric and living donors. These instruments are independent of state specific levels and changes in altruism among organ donors. Using a two staged least squares approach, we first estimate the effect of traffic safety laws on the supply of cadaveric organs, then estimate living donors as a function of obesity rates and predicted cadaveric donors.
In the first stage, we estimate the following model:
where CD st represents cadaveric kidney donations per 100,000, s indexes state, t indexes year, & ' #$ is a matrix of dummy variables capturing changes in traffic safety laws (full and partial helmet laws, primary and secondary seat belt laws, rural highway speed limits, and urban highway speed limits), and ( #$ is a matrix containing state disposable per capita income and state population.
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The unobserved error e st captures all unobserved changes within a state and overtime associated with cadaveric donations. These unobserved measures may include variation in the causes of hospital deaths, changes in medical technology, and differences in altruism. Two specifications of the error term are proposed to control for these unobserved changes:
where * # is a state fixed effect, + $ is a year fixed effect, -# is a state specific time trend, and , #$ is an idiosyncratic state-year shock. The first specification of the error term is commonly used to exploit the panel nature of the data. The second specification treats changes in time as a linear function. We find this specification useful because the instruments we use are primarily dummy variables that change depending on year and state. The year fixed effect may confound some of these effects. Table 2 contains estimates of % and ) under different specifications of the error term.
All specifications are weighted by state population and include standard errors, which are robust to clustering within state over time. Each column represents a progression in controls with respect to the error term. Column (1) indicates that helmet laws (both full and partial)
would lead to an increase in cadaveric donors (21% increase with partial helmet laws and 8% increase with full helmet laws), seat belt laws are not found to affect donor rates in a statistically significant manner, and rural speed limits are found to decrease donations at 60 mph by 36%, but increase them at 70 mph by 33%. Yet, as shown in Columns (4) and (5), these correlations tend to be spurious when state and time fixed effects are used. Only partial helmet laws are found to be statistically significant at the 5% level. Partial helmet laws decrease cadaveric kidney donations -.14 per 100,000 population or -6.8%. These estimates are on par with Dickert-Conlin, Elder, and Moore (2009) who find a 10% decrease using all organ types.
In the second stage, we use predicted levels of cadaveric kidney donors along with changes in obesity rates to capture substitution patterns between living and cadaveric organ donors. The living donor equation is specified as follows:
where LD measures living kidney donors per 100,000 population, 2 #$ are predicted cadaveric donors per 100,000 population, Obesity is a matrix of dummy variables separating each state s in year t into the following categories as a percentage of the population who is obese: 10-14%, 15-19%, 20-24%, and 25% or greater. The null set contains states with obesity rates less than 10%. The potential for endogeneity of cadaveric organs stems from unobserved altruism.
Although individuals incur a smaller cost when donating organs at the time of their death than when they are alive, there must still be some level of altruism present for organs to be supplied at a price of zero. Therefore, advertisement campaigns and websites that encourage organ donations may increase levels of altruism to both living and cadaveric donors. Failing to control for altruism may lead researchers to conclude that the number of living donors and cadaveric donors are positively correlated. We propose using traffic safety laws as instruments for the supply of cadaveric donors. Many of these laws are initially adopted by states because the federal government tied federal highway maintenance/construction funds to these laws.
Therefore, these laws were neither adopted to affect altruism levels in the state, nor to manipulate the supply of cadaveric/living organ donors. 14 In addition to this substitution effect, we find mixed results with respect to obesity rates. In all of the specifications (except for IV2) the obesity indicators are found to increase the level of living donors. The largest contributors are states with obesity rates between 15-19% and 20-24%. The average effect for these two groups across the models is .256 living donors per 100,000 (an increase of 16%) and .285 living donors per 100,000 (an increase of 17%). These obesity indicator variables capture both current and future demand for organs.
As the demand for organs rises, the probability of receiving a cadaveric organ decreases because the waiting list becomes longer; thereby increasing the net benefit to a living donor.
As previously mentioned, the use of year fixed effects greatly diminishes the effect of obesity rates on living donors. In OLS2 and IV2, the coefficients of the obesity indicator variables decrease in magnitude and are statistically indistinguishable from zero. When state specific 13 Both with no fixed effects or only year fixed effects, we find a positive point estimate on cadaveric donors per capita when estimated using OLS. 14 Helmet laws decrease kidney cadaveric donors by 6%. Living donors per 100,000 decreases by .614 for one additional cadaveric donor per 100,000; therefore, helmet laws increase living donor rates by .042=(.06) (.614) time trends are used, obesity rates between 15 -24% are found to be statistically significant at the 1% level and point estimates for all the obesity variables are positive.
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Lastly, we turn our attention to non-biological living donors. The use of laparoscopic surgery to remove kidneys has greatly reduced pain and recovery time for living donors. In addition to the reduction of these non-pecuniary costs, this procedure has allowed donors to return to work faster leading to fewer lost wages. Although not covered by public or private insurance, NOTA does allow donors to be compensated for travel, lost wages, child care, and other expenses that are directly related to the transplant procedure. 16 Therefore, a link between disposable income and non-biological kidney donors potentially exits.
The living donor variable in equation (4) is disaggregated into biological and nonbiological donors. Equation (4) is re-estimated under these two subsamples and the estimates are found in Table 4 . For brevity we focus our discussion on disposable state income per capita and state population. 17 The dependent variable is estimated both in levels and per capita (100,000 population). Disposable income per capita is found to be statistically significant only with respect to non-biological donors. An increase of $10,000 in state income per capita increases the number of non-biological donors by 30.8 (.117 per capita), which is equivalent to an increase in the living donor rate by 7%. Disposable income per capita is estimated to have a 15 We also consider using average charitable contribution levels from IRS tax returns between 1997-2007 as a proxy for altruism. An increase in charitable contributions is found to have a positive and statistically significant effect on living donor rates, but contributions levels do not affect the IV point estimates on the effect of cadaveric donor rates on living donor rates. These results are available from the authors. 16 We do consider the role of health insurance on the supply of living donors. We collected data from the March CPS and constructed variables capturing the percentage of individuals with no health insurance, private insurance, and government insurance. These variables are not found to have a statistically distinguishable affect on living donor rates at conventional levels. These estimates are available from the authors upon request. 17 Interested readers can obtain the other estimated coefficients from the authors, but the qualitative results do not vary greatly from those found using living donors as the dependent variable.
positive effect in both the biological donor equation and the living donor equation, but neither coefficient is distinguishable from zero at conventional significance levels.
Conclusion
The discussion on the organ shortage is full of suggestions on how to alleviate the problem, but little empirical evidence exists discussing the motives and incentives surrounding living donors. In this paper, we consider how living donors react to changes in the supply of cadaveric donors and the looming obesity epidemic. We propose an instrumental variables model to control for unobserved variation in altruism between states, which may potentially cause a positive correlation between living and cadaveric donors within a state. Utilizing variation in traffic safety laws as instruments for the supply of cadaveric donors, we estimate that one additional cadaveric kidney donor per 100,000 decreases living donors by .614 per 100,000 or 37%. Further, a nationwide repeal on helmet laws would lead to a net increase in kidney donations of 1.8%. In addition to these results, we find the rise in obesity within the United States has contributed to the increase in living donor rates by as much as 17% and state disposable income per capita is positively correlated with the rate of non-biological living donors, but not biological living donors.
Although further research is necessary, understanding the trade-offs faced by living donors is important to allow for more informed policy choices. Less than 1 percent of hospital deaths are suitable for organ transplant. 18 The organ shortage will not be resolved through cadaveric donations alone, but rather in conjunction with living donations. Currently, compensation for organs is considered unlawful, but a potential alternative may come in the 3) States with obesity rates less than 10% are captured by the constant 4) Significance level: a = 1%; b = 5%; and c = 10% 2) Controls include indicator variables accounting for changes in obesity, seat belt laws, helmet laws, and speed limit laws 3) Standard errors, in parentheses, are robust to clustering within state over time. 4) Significance level: a = 1%; b = 5%; and c = 10%
